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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900319-CA 
v. t 
DAVID ERNEST MONTOYA, * Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted rape, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-
102 and 76-5-402 (1990), in the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Weber County, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, 
presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit "plain error" in failing to 
appoint alienists to examine defendant prior to sentencing? To 
satisfy the "plain error" test, the alleged error must have been 
"plain," that is, from examination of the record it should be 
obvious that the court was committing error, and the error must 
have affected the substantial rights of the defendant, that is, 
the error must have been harmful. State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
Was trial counsel ineffective? Failure to cite to the 
record in support of allegations and reference to matters outside 
of the record render this Court unable to address substantively 
defendant's argument. State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986). 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing 
to dismiss a juror for cause. "A motion to dismiss a prospective 
juror for cause is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.11 State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are incorporated in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated 
sexual assault, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Cods 
Ann. § 76-5-405 (1990) (R.l). After a jury trial, defendant was 
convicted of attempted rape, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102 and 76-5-402 (1990) (R. 105). On 
December 15, 1988, defendant was sentenced to a term of one to 15 
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 94). 
Defendant initially did not file a timely appeal. 
However, apparently pursuant to State stipulation, defendant was 
resentenced so that he could timely appeal (see R. 96, 99). 
Defendant was resentenced on May 14, 1990 and timely filed a 
notice of appeal on June 13, 1990 (R. 124, 120). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts surrounding the underlying offense in this 
case are not in dispute. Defendant's claims of error involve 
issues arising from the trial itself. Therefore, only those 
facts pertinent to the issues raised on appeal will be recounted. 
Defendant challenged one juror, Carma Jensen, for cause 
(R. 192). Ms. Jensen was a clerk in the circuit court in the 
criminal division and was acquainted with both attorneys (R. 152, 
193). She was "closely related with" a Montoya family but did 
not know defendant, although she had heard his name before in her 
office (R. 152, 193). She stated that she did not think that 
what she had heard or knew would have any influence on her (R. 
152-3). She also stated that she would not feel uncomfortable 
ruling against either attorney (R. 193). The trial court denied 
defendant's challenge (R. 194). 
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defendant 
requested that a presentence report be prepared and that a 
psychological examination be ordered. In that regard, the 
following discussion ensued: 
MR. POORMAN [defense counsel]: Your honor, 
it's my client's desire to request a pre-
sentence report in this matter. . . . 
We would also request of the Court a court 
order with regards to a psychological 
examination of Mr. Montoya while he stays at-
tending the pre-sentence report. . . . 
. . . 
THE COURT: All right. So ordered. 
. . . 
MS. GARNER [Adult Parole and Probation]; Are 
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you going to use alienists or are you going 
to use — 
THE COURT: I think probably that might be 
preferable. 
MS. GARNER: Can they get it done? I mean, 
can they see him? What—I think, if I may 
express myself, he needs or wants treatment 
or at least to be seen by someone right now. 
He's really concerned about his—about his 
well-being. 
THE COURT: Well, rather than doing it on a 
formal basis and to appoint an alienist, why 
don't we just refer the matter to Weber 
County Mental Health and let's have someone 
from Mental Health come over and visit with 
him. 
MR. POORMAN: That will be fine, your honor. 
THE COURT: Why don't we do this. Let's 
contact Steve Watson and just explain that 
they're not—they're not only concerned about 
the sentence, but the defendant apparently is 
having some problems. So we'll have Mr. 
Watson or someone from his office come over 
and speak to him. 
(R. 419-20). 
Defendant was seen 12 days later by Steve Watson, who 
wrote that defendant had a "clear stream of thought. [He] 
[m]akes some suggestion of hallucination but genuineness is 
questionable. Wants sleeping or nerve pills. If continues in 
jail here, evaluate further in one week" (R. 93) (a copy of the 
assessment is attached hereto in the addendum). 
Defendant was sentenced to a term of one to 15 years at 
the Utah State Prison (R.94). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not commit "plain error" in failing 
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to order that defendant be examined by alienists prior to 
sentencing. Defendant has not demonstrated that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have been different 
had he been examined by alienists. Likewise, defendant has not 
shown that, based on examination of the record, the trial court 
obviously erred. 
Defendant has based his claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on allegations supported solely by references to 
matters outside of the record and has not cited to anything in 
the record in support of his claim. Consequently, this Court 
cannot review substantively his claim. 
The trial court acted within its discretion in refusing 
to dismiss a juror for cause. It properly applied rule 18(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in assessing whether the juror 
should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT "PLAIN ERROR" 
IN FAILING TO APPOINT ALIENISTS TO EXAMINE 
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO SENTENCING. 
Defendant requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's failure to appoint an alienist and remand for a new trial 
(Br. of Appellant at 21 J.1 He argues that the trial court 
1
 Defendant also suggests that the trial court failed to 
determine defendant's competency to proceed with trial (See Br. 
of Appellant at 13, 21). Nothing in the record supports the 
allegation that defendant, at any time prior to, during or after 
trial sought to have himself declared incompetent. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1990), "a person is incompetent to 
proceed if he is suffering from a mental disease or defect 
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committed "plain error" in failing to order that he be examined 
by two or more alienists prior to sentencing, in accordance with 
the mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-2 (1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two-part test 
to determine whether a trial court has committed plain error. 
First, the error must be "plain;" that is, from examination of 
the record it should be obvious that the court was committing 
error. Second, the error must have affected the substantial 
rights of the defendant; that is, the error must have been 
harmful. Thus, an error requires reversal if confidence in the 
outcome of a trial is eroded and that, absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been 
different. State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).2 
resulting either: (1) In his inability to comprehend the nature 
of the proceedings against him or the punishment specified for 
the offense charged; or (2) In his inability to assist his 
counsel in his defense." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 
(1990), "[w]henever a person who is charged with a public 
offense, or who is serving a sentence of imprisonment, is or 
becomes incompetent. . ., a petition may be filed in the district 
court of the county where the charge is pending or where the 
person is confined." Defendant has not filed such a petition in 
the district court, either through trial counsel or appellate 
counsel. Accordingly, any argument concerning competency should 
be rejected as inapplicable to this appeal. 
2
 Eldredqe's "plain error" analysis was predicated upon 
rule 103 (d), Utah Rules of Evidence, which governs rulings on 
the admissibility of evidence ("Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court."). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court, although still relying on rule 
103(d), has expanded the "plain error" doctrine to embrace errors 
not based on evidentiary rulings. See State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 
819, 821 (Utah 1989) (where "plain error" analysis was applied in 
the context of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct). 
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In the instant case, defendant's allegation of error 
does not go to the trial itself but only to the sentencing. 
Therefore, when assessing the second prong of the "plain error" 
test, this Court is limited to determining whether, absent the 
trial court's failure to appoint alienists, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that defendant's sentence would have been different. 
Defendant has neither alleged nor provided any argument or 
evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that his sentence 
would have been different had alienists been appointed. Instead, 
he has requested this Court to reverse the trial court's failure 
to appoint an alienist and remand for a new trial. That relief 
is not appropriate within the context of his allegation of error. 
Therefore, his claim should be rejected. 
Defendant has likewise failed to meet the requirements 
of the obviousness prong of the "plain error" test. The statute 
on which he bases his argument, Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-1 (1990), 
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Whenever a person is convicted of or pleads 
guilty to rape . . . or an attempt to commit 
[rape]. . ., and when it appears to the court 
either upon its own observation or upon 
evidence otherwise presented, that the 
defendant may be suffering from any form of 
mental disease or defect which may have 
substantially contributed to the commission 
of the offense, the court shall order a 
mental examination of that person.3 
Therefore, arguably, the doctrine could be applied to defendant's 
allegation in the instant case. 
3The requirement that alienists under Utah Code Ann. § 77-
16-2 (1990) is not triggered unless the requirements of section 
77-16-1 are satisfied. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this section as 
imposing "a mandatory obligation" on a trial judge to order a 
mental examination if there is evidence of such a "mental disease 
or defect".4 State v. DePlontv, 749 P.2d 621, 625 (Utah 1987). 
In the instant case no evidence appears in the record that would 
have mandated a mental examination. 
In support of his claim to the contrary, defendant 
states that he requested a psychological examination,5 that the 
trial judge "recognized that it would 'preferred' [sic] to 
appoint an alienist," and that a note from Weber County Mental 
Health stated that defendant claimed to be suffering from 
hallucinations, but that the genuineness of the claim was 
questionable (Br. of Appellant at 12, 13).6 A request for a 
4
 At the time of defendant's trial, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
305(4) (1990) defined mental illness, as follows: "'mental 
illness' means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may 
be a congenital condition or one the result of an injury or a 
residual effect of a physical or mental disease. Mental illness 
does not mean a personality or character disorder or abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct." The statute was 
amended, effective March 13, 1990, resulting in an expanded 
definition. 
5
 Defendant states that he requested psychological testing 
both prior to and after trial. However, nothing in the record 
supports his assertion that a request was made prior to trial, 
and that allegation should be ignored. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 
296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to matters outside the record 
are inappropriate, irrelevant and will not be considered). 
6
 Defendant also argues that a presentence report indicated 
a prior history of ongoing mental illness, and he has addended a 
copy of the alleged report to his brief (Br. of Appellant at 13). 
However, that report is not part of the appellate record, and its 
authenticity cannot be verified. Therefore, it should not be 
considered by this Court. 
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psychological examination alone cannot be considered evidence of 
mental illness. Cf. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 
1989) (where the Utah Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of 
competency to stand trial, relied on the principle that "[a]n 
uncorroborated assertion of mental illness at trial was not 
sufficient to require a competency hearing"). Similarly, the 
judge's comment is not evidence of mental illness. It does point 
to the judge's awareness of the issue of defendant's mental 
condition, but the judge only stated that he thought that such an 
appointment "probably . . . might be preferable" (R. 419-20). 
Instead, after further consideration, he ordered an assessment by 
Weber County Mental Health. The results of that assessment were 
neutral, at best. 
The transcript of defendant's trial likewise offers no 
obvious evidence that defendant was suffering from a mental 
disease or defect that may have substantially contributed to the 
commission of his offense. Defendant testified at length and 
coherently about the events of the evening of the attempted rape 
and his contact with the victim (R. 368-92). Although his 
testimony contrasted sharply with the victim's testimony, nothing 
in it suggests mental disease or defect. Defendant has not met 
his burden of showing that it is obvious, from examination of the 
record, that the trial court committed plain error in not 
ordering a mental examination of defendant by appointed alienists 
prior to sentencing pursuant to sections 77-16-1 and -2. 
Eldredge, 772 P.2d at 35. 
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Defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of the 
"plain error" test and has failed to request an appropriate 
remedy. His argument, therefore, should be rejected. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO CITE TO THE RECORD AND 
HIS REFERENCES TO MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE 
RECORD RENDER THIS COURT UNABLE TO ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL 
COUNSEL. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because he did not make a reasonable inquiry into his mental 
health. In support of that argument he makes numerous 
allegations concerning his contact with his trial attorney prior 
to trial concerning his mental state and to events allegedly 
occurring more than two years after his conviction. Defendant 
has not cited to the record in support of his allegations.7 
Moreover, all of the allegations of deficiencies refer to matters 
outside of the record. Therefore, they should not be considered 
by this Court. State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) 
("[D]efendant has failed to refer to pages in the record in 
support of his point on appeal. These deficiencies will normally 
require us to assume regularity in the proceedings below and 
correctness in the judgment appealed from." (citations omitted)); 
Cook, 714 P.2d at 297 (references to matters outside of the 
record are inappropriate, irrelevant and will not be considered). 
7
 Defendant does cite to the record one time. He notes 
that trial counsel did request a psychological evaluation (Br. of 
Appellant at 15). That citation supports trial counsel's 
competency. 
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In the absence of any record support for defendant's 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court 
cannot enter into a substantive analysis under the test 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401 (Utah 1986).8 Therefore, defendant's claim should be 
rejected. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO DISMISS A JUROR FOR CAUSE. 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in refusing to dismiss a juror for 
cause. The juror in question, Carma Jensen, was a circuit court 
clerk (R. 152). She knew both attorneys, was related to a 
Montoya family, and she did not know defendant but had heard his 
8
 Interpreting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
(1984), the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant has the burden to 
demonstrate that counsel's representation falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. . . . Defendant must 
prove that specific, identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. 
. . . 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be prejudicial to 
defendant. It is not enough to claim that the alleged 
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome or could 
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact finders. To be 
found sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively 
show that a "reasonable probability" exists that, but for 
counsel's error, the result would have been different. We 
have defined "reasonable probability" as that sufficient to 
undermine the confidence in the reliability of the verdict. 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. See also State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 
(Utah 1989). 
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name (R. 152, 193). She stated that she did not know enough 
about the case to be concerned about being neutral and that she 
would not feel uncomfortable ruling against either of the 
attorneys (jrd.). 
"A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. 
Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989)). An appellate court 
M
'will presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary.'" JEd. (quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-
35 (Utah 1984)). An appellant has the burden of establishing 
that reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion.9 
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906 (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439f 
448)). In determining whether a trial court has abused its 
discretion, "[d]ue consideration should be given to the trial 
judge's somewhat advantaged position in determining which persons 
would be fair and impartial jurors. . . ." Salt Lake City v. 
Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) (quoting Jenkins 
v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981)). This Court has 
observed, however, that the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a 
9
 In articulating the defendant's burden in alleging error 
as a result of a denial of a challenge for cause, it appears that 
the appellate courts will also employ a harmless error analysis. 
Even if a defendant shows that the trial court abused its 
discretion, he or she must then show that, absent the error, 
there was a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
more favorable to the defendant. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 
1221, 1230 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
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trial court's discretion in selecting a jury must be viewed "'in 
light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any 
problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another.'" State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536).10 
Because it is the trial court's duty to see that a defendant's 
constitutional right to an impartial jury is safeguarded, it must 
fully investigate a juror's potential bias. Woollev, 810 P.2d at 
442. 
The Utah Supreme Court has given the following guidance 
to courts in assessing a potential juror's ability to act 
impartially: 
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be 
supposed to yield to the testimony that may 
be offered; which may leave the mind open to 
a fair consideration of that testimony, 
constitute no sufficient objection to a 
juror; but that those strong and deep 
impressions which will close the mind against 
the testimony that may be offered in 
opposition to them; which will combat that 
testimony and resist its force, do constitute 
a sufficient objection to him. 
State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Revnolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878)). If comments 
by a potential juror facially bring into question that juror's 
10
 In citing Jenkins v. Parrish, this Court noted that that 
decision appeared to apply a "some deference,f as opposed to a 
"sound discretion" standard of review. In so noting, the Court 
stated that, regardless of the standard of review, a judge's 
discretion must be viewed in light of this factor. Woollev, 810 
P.2d at 442 n.3. However, this Court has not suggested what 
weight should given to that factor. In light of the more recent 
"sound discretion" mandate of Gotschall, it appears that it 
should not be the determinative factor. 
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partiality or prejudice, the trial court or counsel must 
investigate further and find the inference rebutted or dismiss 
the juror. State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906 (citing State v. 
Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Utah 1989)). See also State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. 
Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
identifies the grounds on which a challenge for cause of a 
potential juror may be taken. The rule states, in pertinent 
part, the following grounds: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between a prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because he 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part 
of the juror with reference to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging . . . . 
Defendant relies on subsection (14) and State v. 
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), to support his allegation of 
error. However, Brooks interprets the meaning of "actual bias," 
as defined under section 77-30-18(2), as a right to challenge a 
prospective juror. However, section 77-30-18(2) was repealed in 
1980, and the sections governing challenges for cause were 
-14-
radically changed. No section equivalent to 77-30-18(2) now 
exists. Therefore, the precedential value of that case at the 
present time is questionable. 
Moreover, the ftrooks court specifically addressed the 
I 
situation of when a prospective juror "through a personal 
association with a witness or party has developed a relationship 
of affection, respect, or esteem [for that person and therefore] 
cannot be deemed disinterested, indifferent, impartial." Jd. at 
802. In the instant case, there is no evidence of such an 
association.11 Ms. Jensen knew both attorneys but stated that 
she would not feel uncomfortable in ruling against either (R. 
193). She did not know defendant (R. 152). Although Ms. Jensen 
was familiar with defendant's name, nothing in the record 
suggests that she could not be neutral. The trial court 
specifically asked whether her knowledge of defendant and the 
case would affect her ability to be neutral. She responded, "No. 
No. " (R. 193). Nothing she said even facially raised the 
question of partiality or prejudice. See State v. Jonas, 793 
P.2d at 906. Moreover, rule 18(e)(4) states that "[a] 
prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because [s]he 
is . . . employed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof." 
11
 Defendant makes numerous allegations and draws 
inferences concerning Ms. Jensen's associations with the judge, 
the trial attorneys and defendant (Br. of Appellant at 18-20). 
Defendant fails to cite to the record in support of the 
allegations and inferences and cannot do so because the record 
does not support them. Therefore, this Court should disregard 
the allegations. Olmos, 712 P.2d at 287. 
-15-
Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying his challenge for 
cause or that abuse resulted in reversible error. Jonas, 793 
P. 2d at 906. His claim should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ? day of August, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
K
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iissistant Attorney General 
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